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Abstract
How does partisan alignment with the president affect the distribution of federal
competitive grant funding? This analysis contributes to the literature on distribu-
tive politics by reexamining the relationship between alignment with the president
and competitive grant funding over the time period of 2001 to 2017. Furthermore,
the analysis will test if the relationship between alignment and competitive grant
funding changed after the enactment of the 2011 earmark moratorium. Fractional
probit regression is used to model the relationship between a representative’s par-
tisan alignment with the president and the portion of annual competitive grant
funding that their district receives. The results suggest that there is no rela-
tionship between alignment and competitive grant funding when looking at grant
funding across all federal agencies. However, when only examining agencies that
are susceptible to presidential influence a weak relationship emerges. Findings
also suggest that this relationship developed after the enactment of the earmark
moratorium.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
How does partisan alignment with the president affect the geographic distribution
of federal competitive grant funding? A wide range of research in the field of
public choice examines the political factors that influence the distribution of federal
funds. However, the majority of this research has focused on the U.S. Congress
(Bertelli and Grose, 2009; Berry et al., 2010; Hudak, 2014). Distributive politics
literature tends to focus on the role played by individual members of congress
and committees in the grant funding allocation process (Collie, 1988; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1981; Weingast, 1994; Clemens et al., 2015a), while strong party and
party cartel models emphasize political parties within the congressional budget
appropriations process (Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Far
less attention has been focused on presidential influence on the grant allocation.
However, in recent years a new line of research has started to examine the
president’s role in the budget appropriations process. This strand of research
finds that the president has a major effect on the distribution of federal funds.
There is growing evidence that the president influences the flow of federal dollars
to target swing voters, his core supporters, and informed voters (Stromberg, 2004;
Yong and Sobel, 2013; Larcinese et al, 2012). One seminal work in this field is
from Berry et al. (2010), which found that Congressional districts represented
by members of the same political party as the president received higher levels of
federal spending over the time period of 1984 to 2007. This paper will reexamine
2this relationship with competitive grant funds over the time period 2001-2017.
The analysis will adopt the same identification strategy as Berry et al. (2010).
The model identification arises from the fact that a change in district alignment
can be the result of two different independent factors. First, alignment can change
as a result of a change in the political party of the representative holding the par-
tisanship of the president constant. Second, alignment may change as a result of a
change in the partisanship of the president holding the partisanship of the repre-
sentative constant. Congressional district and year fixed effects are also included
in the model along with economic and political control variables.
This study extends Berry et al. (2010) research in three major ways. First,
the dependent variable is the portion of annual competitive grant funding that a
district receives in a given year. Therefore, a fractional probit regression model
will be used to properly specify the functional form. Second, the importance of
alignment between the president and at least one of the state’s senators will also
be tested, and senate control variables will be added to the model. Third, the
analysis will test if the relationship between partisan alignment with the presi-
dent and competitive grant funding changed after the enactment of the earmark
moratorium.
In 2011, the House of Representatives (H.O.R.) and the Senate both enacted
a moratorium on earmarks. The moratorium was supposed to curtail corrupt
behavior in earmarking and to decrease government spending. However, the effect
of the earmark moratorium may have been to transfer the power and practice
of earmarking from the congressional branch to the executive branch giving the
president and his cabinet secretaries more influence in the grant appropriations
process (White, 2015). Thus the topic of executive influence in distributive politics
may be more relevant now due to the major changes in how federal grant funds
are awarded that have occurred in the last decade.
My results suggest that partisan alignment with the president does not have
an effect on total competitive grant funding. The state and congressional district
3alignment variables are not statically significant in any model that uses total grant
fund as the dependent variable. However, this finding arises from heterogeneity in
federal agencies. When grant funding from agencies that are susceptible to pres-
idential influence is examined, there is evidence of a weak relationship between
alignment and competitive grant funding. Furthermore, the relationship between
competitive grant funding and alignment appears to have changed after the en-
actment of the earmark moratorium. During the period when earmarking was
allowed, there is not a significant relationship between alignment and competitive
grant funding. However, after the enactment of the moratorium the results sug-
gest that aligned districts located in aligned states receive a larger share of annual
competitive grant funding.
The paper is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 will review the literature on dis-
tributive politics. Chapter 3 describes the budget appropriations process and the
channels for presidential influence. Chapter 4 contains a description of the data
set. In Chapter 5 the research design and identification strategy is discussed.
The results from the base model and the analysis examining if a structural break
occurred in 2011 are discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7 the paper
concludes with a brief summary of the findings and suggests topics for future
research.
4Chapter 2
Literature Review
There has been a large amount of research examining the political determinants of
grant funding. This research can be broken up into three broad categories based
on the different variables that are examined and theoretical frameworks that were
proposed. The three primary categories are: distributive politics, political parties,
and the executive branch.
2.1 Distributive Politics
Theories in distributive politics explain government spending as the result of a
bargaining process where benefits, in the form of funds, are geographically dis-
tributed across districts. Weingast (1994) notes that a program can be considered
a distributive program if it meets three criteria: divisibility, omnibus, and expen-
diture. A program is divisible if it is composed of a wide array of local projects
that can be independently varied in size and funding amount. A program is con-
sidered omnibus if it is a conglomeration of many independent smaller projects.
Lastly, the policy can be classified as an expenditure policy if its primary purpose
is to allocate government funds.
One central aspect of early distributive politics theories was the universal-
ism hypothesis first introduced by Mayhew (1974) and formalized by Weingast’s
(1979). The universalism hypothesis maintains that every member of Congress
5should receive some distributive funding because politicians are rational and seek
to maximize the probability that they are reelected. Since distributive benefits
take up a relatively small portion of the federal budget they typically occupy a
low level of salience. Thus, the political costs of engaging in distributive politics
are minimal. However, distributive programs provide highly concentrated benefits
to the politician’s home district or state. Thus, the political benefits of engaging
in distributive politics are high. Therefore, members of Congress will over provide
distributive programs and every member of Congress will seek to engage in dis-
tributive politics due to the low level of political costs (Collie 1988; Shepsle and
Weingast 1981).
Despite widespread theoretical attention empirical evidence for the universal-
ism hypothesis is fairly weak. Casico and Washington (2014) find some evidence
of universalism at the state level. They examine the change in education spend-
ing allocated to predominantly African American localities after the removal of
literacy test requirements for voter registration. The results indicate that the re-
moval of the test led to a statistically significant increase in education spending in
African American communities. However, this finding may be partially the result
of the nature of the program. Education spending is highly visible to the local
community and the benefits are concentrated to the local area. Stein and Bickers
(1994b) find no support for universalism in the distribution of congressional out-
lays. Their finding suggests that two aspects of distributive politics theories must
be reconsidered. First, that the public may not be aware of the benefits. Second,
not all members of Congress have an equal ability to influence the flow of grant
funds.
Lee (2003) argues that members of the HOR gain very little political benefits
from grants allocated to their state because these funds may not reach their home
district. Furthermore, members of the HOR cannot claim credit for funds that
were allocated to their state and not their district. Lee finds that political factors
have a much larger effect on the allocation of earmark funds than on grant-in-aid
6funds. This is due to the fact that House members can claim credit for earmarks
but not grant in aid funds, which are distributed to states.
Members of Congress may also differ in their ability to extract distributive
benefits. This is a core aspect of modern distributive politics research that was
overlooked by the early theorists (Stein and Bickers, 1994b). Research has found
mixed support for a positive relationship between seniority and distributive spend-
ing. Lazarus (2010) finds that more senior members received more funds in the
2008 fiscal year, while Fowler and Hill (2015) find no evidence of this relationship.
There is also mixed support for vulnerable incumbents receiving more distribu-
tive funds. Some research finds support for this theory (Stein and Bickers 1994a;
Lazarus 2010), while other studies find no evidence of a relationship between elec-
toral vulnerability and distributive spending (Clemens, et al., 2015b; Balla et al.,
2002).
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that committees play a major
role in distributive politics. Research finds that committee members tend to re-
ceive more distributive benefits from policies in the areas which their committee
has oversight (Knight, 2005; Clemens et al., 2015b). A large amount of research
also finds that members of the appropriations committee receive more distribu-
tive funding (Lazarus, 2010; Lazarus 2009, De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006,
Clemens et al., 2015b). There have also been mixed findings concerning if a mem-
ber’s position within the committee affects the amount of distributive benefits
they receive. Clemens et al (2015b) find that appropriations committee chairs,
cardinals, and members of the house leadership all received more earmark receipts
in the 2008 fiscal year, while Kasdin and Lin (2015) and Lazarus (2010) found no
evidence of a relationship between committee position and distributive benefits.
72.2 Political Parties
Early research in distributive politics largely overlooked the role of political parties.
This was due to the predominant view that political parties were weak institutions
in American politics. That thought dominated much of the 20th century research
(Downs, 1957; Levitt and Snyder, 1995). However, the growth in the ideological
divergence between the Republican and Democratic political parties since 1980
has led to an increase in research examining the relationship between political
parties and distributive politics.
Early models that emphasize the role of political parties in distributive pol-
itics typically assume that political parties are rational unitary actors. Parties
maximize re-election and policy goals through the use of government funds and
are typically constrained by the need to have a balanced budget. It is typically
assumed that parties operate under some level of uncertainty about the distribu-
tion of partisan support in the electorate (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Levitt and
Snyder (1995) state that these models typically predict that the majority party
allocates government funds between policy goals and member districts in a way
that is optimal for their legislative interests, with a high level of precision.
This work culminated with Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) seminal party car-
tel theory, which explains how the majority party can monopolize the legislative
agenda. In this model, the majority party attempts to monopolize the legislative
agenda by placing its members on committees and in leadership positions that
have major influence over which bills will be voted on. A party cartel is achieved
if members of the majority party hold most of the seats in Congress with agenda-
setting power. Then members of the majority party can block bills from coming to
the floor that conflict with the majority party’s interests. If the majority party can
secure a cartel over the legislative agenda they will also divert more resources to
party members. Thus, benefits should be distributed disproportionately towards
members of the majority party. However, the majority party will still allow some
8resources to flow to the minority party because they would like to share part of
blame for pork barrel politics with the minority party (Balla et al., 2002).
There has been a large amount of empirical research examining the role of the
majority party in distributive politics. The majority of this research finds that
members of the majority party receive disproportionately more federal funds while
minority party members still receiving some federal spending (Balla et al., 2002;
Albouy, 2013; Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009). Research also finds that states with
a large majority party vote share receive more funds (Levitt and Snyder, 1995),
and electorally vulnerable majority party members receive more funding (Lazarus,
2009). Lastly, Grossman (1994) finds that aligned state legislatures received more
grant funding.
2.3 The Executive Branch
Although the majority of academic research focuses on Congress there is some
theoretical and empirical evidence of presidential influence in the grant allocation
process. Berry et al. (2010) note that there are two channels with which the
president can influence the appropriations process; ex-ante and ex-post influence.
The ex-ante channel concerns the influence that is at the president’s disposal be-
fore a federal budget has been passed. This primarily takes the form of proposal
power and veto power. Ex-post influence occurs after the federal budget has been
passed. The president can influence which projects get funding by appointing
cabinet secretaries that will fund projects which conform to the president’s inter-
ests. Research finds that the President directs more distributive benefits towards
swing voters in competitive states during years in which the president is running
for re-election (Stromberg, 2004; and Kang, 2018), and also redirects funds to his
core constituency in order to pay them back for their support (Young and Sobel,
2013; Larcinese et al., 2006).
There is also evidence that executive agencies face more than just ex-post
9pressure from the President. Ting (2012) notes that agencies are also under con-
gressional pressure. In Ting’s model, the distribution of federal grants is the result
of Congress’s decision to professionalize or politicize the budget. Under a profes-
sionalized budgetary regime the funds are allocated according to the quality of the
proposed projects. In a politicized regime, the distribution of funds are allocated
according to political power. Ting’s results indicate that legislatures will politicize
the budgeting process if there is a high probability of the politicized budget being
accepted.
Kasdin and Lin (2015) extend this model to incorporate the interest of bureau-
cratic agencies. Agencies maximize their policy goals subject to the need to secure
funding. Securing funding is a function of congressional support. Kasdin and Lin
note that there are three possible equilibrium conditions. First, the majority party
supports the agency. If the agency has the support of the majority party, then
the agency will not alter how it distributes funding. Second, the majority party is
indifferent towards the agency. Under this regime, the agency will not alter how
it distributes funds. Lastly, the majority party is opposed to the agency. If the
majority party is opposed to the agency, then the agency will allocate more funds
to districts of majority party members in order to buy their support.
There is some empirical evidence of congressional ex-post budgetary influence.
Mills et al. (2016) find that the moratorium on earmarks reduced the level of
influence that Congress has over the distribution of federal funds. However, their
results indicate that members of Congress can still circumvent the ban through in-
formal means of communication with the bureaucracy. Kasdin and Lin (2015) ex-
amine the change in the distribution of agency funding after the 2006 election when
the majority party shifted from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.
Their results indicate that agencies that are supported by Democrats or agencies
which Democrats are indifferent towards did not have a statistically significant
change in their spending patterns. However, agencies favored by Republicans had
a statistically significant shift in spending patterns toward Democratic-controlled
10
districts.
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Chapter 3
Background
As previously stated this paper will examine how partisan alignment between a
congressional district’s (state) representative (senator) and the president affects
the portion of annual grant funding that a congressional district (state) receives.
Research suggests that the president has political preferences over how federal
funding is distributed (Berry et al., 2010; McCarty, 2000; Hudak, 2014; Kriner
& Reeves, 2015). In particular, Young and Sobel (2013) find that the president
engages in distributive politics by allocating more funds towards areas with a high
vote share as a way of paying voters back for their support. The president can
also allocate more funds to strategic battleground states in order to increase his
support in that area.
Furthermore, the president has a clear incentive to try to influence the distri-
bution of federal grant spending in favor of members of his own party. Due to the
separation of powers presidents cannot directly introduce legislation in congress,
nor can they vote on legislation. Thus, presidents will turn to their partisan allies
in Congress to further their legislative agenda. Indeed, research finds that the
president has greater legislative support from members of his own political party
than members of the opposing party, and that partisanship has a large effect over
how members of congress vote (Barrett and Eshaugh-Soha, 2007; Ferguson, 2003;
Hager and Talbert, 2000; Middlemass and Grose, 2007). Furthermore, Eshbaugh-
Soha (2005) finds that partisan characteristics of Congress also affect the type
12
of legislative agenda that the president proposes. Under a unified government
presidents propose more major and incremental policies, while under a divided
government presidents propose more short term policies that are not central to
their interests. Thus, presidents have a clear incentive to try to maintain a unified
government because this allows them to further a legislative agenda that is central
to their political interests.
One tool that the president can use to help secure, or maintain, a unified
government is distributive politics. The president may direct the flow of federal
dollars towards aligned members of congress’ district (state). As the number of
federal dollars directed to the aligned member’s district (state) increases this will
lead to an increase in voter satisfaction (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). The increase
in voter satisfaction should lead to an increase in the probability that the member
of Congress is re-elected. Thus through distributive politics, the president can help
secure support for aligned congress members and potentially decrease electoral
support for dis-aligned congress members.
3.1 The Budget Appropriations Process
Although the president has an incentive to influence the flow of federal grant dol-
lars toward aligned members’ districts the question of how the president is able to
exert this influence remains. Figure 3.1 displays a flow chart of the federal budget
approval process. As this figure illustrates, the budget approval process starts in
the executive branch. All federal agencies submit their budget recommendations
to the president. The president then takes these recommendations into consid-
eration and develops a federal budget proposal. Then the proposed budget is
submitted to Congress.
Once the proposed federal budget has been submitted to Congress both cham-
bers are tasked with creating the federal budget that will be implemented in the
next fiscal year. The Senate and H.O.R. each pass a budget resolution. This
13
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Figure 3.1: Budget Approval Process
resolution sets the federal spending limits and is written independently in both
chambers. Once both chambers have written a budget resolution they come to-
gether in a joint committee and merge the two plans. After both the H.O.R. and
Senate have agreed on a budget resolution both chambers must pass the identical
resolution. Then the federal budget goes to the appropriations committees in each
chamber. Once in committee twelve appropriations subcommittees in the H.O.R.
and twelve appropriations subcommittees in the Senate are formed. These com-
mittees determine how to allocate the federal funds among all of the executive
agencies.
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Prior to 2011, this was where congressional earmarking entered the budget
appropriations process. Members of Congress would submit earmark spending
requests to their respective committees. For example, if a representative wanted
to earmark transportation funds to build a bridge in their district an earmark
request would be submitted to the transportation committee. Then the Appro-
priations Committee would set the total budget available for earmarked projects.
Each committee would then submit the earmark requests to the appropriations
committee. Then the requests are either approved and added to the federal budget
or denied (Sciara, 2012). However, after the enactment of the 2011 moratorium on
earmarks Congress no longer has the power to explicitly allocate federal funds to a
specific project (Doyle, 2011; White, 2015). Therefore, after the earmark morato-
rium, the House Appropriations Committee (H.A.C.) and Senate Appropriations
Committee (S.A.C.) simply determine the federal budget for each agency and do
not allocate project funding.
Once the budget has passed through the H.A.C. and S.A.C. it goes to both the
H.O.R. and Senate floor for a vote. Both chambers must pass the same federal
budget. Therefore, before the floor vote, the budget goes through a reconciliation
process where any budgetary differences between the two chambers are reconciled.
The senate requires a 60 vote majority in order to pass the budget (otherwise the
proposed budget can be filibustered). After the proposed budget has passed the
floor vote in both chambers it is sent back to the President.
The president can either approve the federal budget or veto the budget. If
approved the president signs the federal budget into law and it is implemented.
In the case of a presidential veto, the budget is sent back to Congress. Congress
can override a presidential veto with a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers.
However, this is extremely difficult to accomplish and Congress has overridden
less than ten percent of all presidential vetoes (History, Art Archives, U.S. House
of Representatives 2020). If there are insufficient votes to overturn the veto then
Congress must make changes to the federal budget to secure the president’s sup-
15
port.
3.2 Presidential Influence
As previously mentioned, the president can influence the budget approprations
process by using either ex-ante or ex-post powers (Berry et al., 2010). The pres-
ident’s ex-ante power is derived from the president’s ability to propose a federal
budget to congress. Research on noncooperative bargaining games finds that the
ability to propose a distribution of benefits gives the proposer considerable influ-
ence over how the benefits are divided up (Knight, 2005; Yildirim, 2007; Albouy,
2013; Berry et al., 2010). Furthermore, the ability to propose a federal budget
allows the president to frame the budget debate in Congress, and include political
objectives within the budget proposal. Lastly, the president can veto any bud-
get that conflicts with his interests. This allows presidents with strong spending
preferences to reject unfavorable spending bills (McCarty, 2000).
Ex post power primarily takes the form of the president’s influence over the bu-
reaucracy. Hudak (2014) notes that the president has a large amount of influence
over the distribution of federal agency grant funds. The president can influence
which projects get competitive grant funding by appointing cabinet secretaries.
Cabinet secretaries make the final decision about which applicants receive grant
funding. Thus the president can appoint cabinet secretaries that will fund projects
that are consistent with his interests. Berry et al. (2010) also note that the pres-
ident can repurpose some budgetary accounts. The president can also transfer
funds between accounts; however, this action must be approved by Congress. Ex-
amples of ex post influence include the Bush administration’s Faith-Based Initia-
tive that created a new agency to provide grants to religious communities (Farris
et al., 2004), the Obama administration’s TIGER program that provided trans-
portation grants to primarily urban areas, and the Trump administration shifting
the TIGER program goals to prioritize rural communities (Scheck and Busche,
16
2019; Lightman and Wieder, 2019).
Thus, the president has considerable influence over the appropriations process
both before the federal budget has been passed and after it has been enacted. The
president also has an incentive to allocate more distributive benefits to aligned
members of Congress. This allows the president to help aid legislative allies’
electorally and pay members of Congress back for their support. Therefore, the
hypothesis is as follows: congressional districts (states) that are represented by
aligned members of Congress will receive a higher portion of annual competitive
grant funding than congressional districts (states) that are not represented by
aligned members of Congress.
17
Chapter 4
Data Description
The data for grant funding was gathered from USAspending.gov. USAspend-
ing.gov is the U.S. government’s official database on federal spending. It contains
data on all grants funded by the federal government and their funding amount
over the time period of 2001-2017, at the recipient level. The data was aggregated
to the congressional district level in order to ascertain the importance of political
alignment to grant funding.
Only competitive grants awarded to state and local governments are considered
in this analysis. The database consists of 3,526,955 awarded grants. This amounts
to approximately $1.384 trillion in competitive grant funding, with an average of
$392, 672.50 per grant and a standard deviation of $9, 191, 606. Following Gor-
don’s (2018) methodology only grants issued to state and local governments were
examined. 1
After removing the nongovernmental grants and the grants with negative fund-
ing values 2 the dataset consists of 672,861 competitive grants. The funding values
1Gordon notes that including grant issued to nonprofits and firms may produce miss leading
results because the area where a firm is headquartered may not be in the same congressional
district as where the work was carried out. Education grants were also excluded because these
funds are often given to state capitals to distribute to school districts throughout the rest of the
state.
2One complication with the annual grant funding variable is that it is mathematically possible
for the total grant dollars that a congressional district receives in a given year to be negative.
This problem arises because funds are allocated to a district in year t− 1 to complete a project.
However, if there are excess funds after the project is completed the funds are returned to the
federal government in year t. These excess funds are recorded in the data as negative values
for the year t. Therefore, for a small portion of the observations, the excess funds returned
18
range from $0.00 to $2.33 billion, with a mean of $807,000 and a standard devi-
ation of $9,097,130. The removal of the nongovernmental grants and grants with
negative funding created a large amount of implicitly missing observations. Table
4.1 displays the number of implicitly missing congressional districts for every year
in the sample. There are a total of 576 implicitly missing congressional districts
across all years in the dataset, which amounts to 7.78% of the total observations. It
is assumed that these districts are implicitly missing because they did not receive
any competitive grant funding that year. Therefore, zero federal grant dollars was
entered for all implicitly missing congressional districts. 3
Table 4.1: Implicitly Missing Congressional Districts
Year Missing Districts
2001 158
2002 172
2003 173
2004 15
2005 19
2006 22
2007 0
2008 4
2009 0
2010 0
2011 0
2012 7
2013 2
2014 0
2015 0
2016 0
2017 4
Total 576
to the federal government in year t was greater than the total amount of competitive grant
funding that the district received in year t. Thus leading to a negative value for the total grant
funding variable when the data was aggregated to the congressional district level. Since these
negative values have no reasonable interpretation all observations with negative funding amounts
were excluded from the analysis. There were only 26 observations with negative values, which
amounts to 0.3515% of the sample. A detailed description of how the grant data was aggregated
from the project level to the congressional district level is available in the appendix.
3As a robustness check this assumption was tested by rerunning all of the analysis in the next
two chapters with all implicitly missing observations excluded for the data set. The exclusion of
implicitly missing observations did not change any of the results. Therefore, these finding have
not been reported.
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4.1 Political Control Variables
Fifteen additional political control variables will be included in the analysis. First,
research has found that the appropriations committees play a major role in dis-
tributive politics in both chambers of government (Berry et al., 2010; Clemens
et al., 2015a; Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009). Therefore two dichotomous con-
trol variables will be included in the analysis: H.O.R. Appropriations and Senate
Appropriations. The H.O.R. appropriations variable was coded as a one if the
district was represented by someone who sat on the appropriations committee,
and zero otherwise. The senate appropriations variable was coded as one if the
state had at least one Senator that sat on the appropriations committee and zero
otherwise. Following Berry et al. (2010) a dichotomous variable to control for a
representative siting on the ways and means committee in the H.O.R. was also
included in the analysis. This variable is called H.O.R. Ways and Means.
There is also some evidence that a representative’s position on the committee
influence the amount of federal grant funding that they receive (Berry et al.,
2010; Clemens et al., 2015a). Three variables were included in the analysis to
control for this H.O.R. Committee Chair, H.O.R. Ranking Member and H.O.R.
First Term. Committee Chair is a dummy variable that was coded as one if
the representative serves as a committee chair on at least one committee and
zero otherwise. Ranking member is a dummy variable that was coded as one
if the representative served as a ranking member of the minority on at least one
committee and zero otherwise. Lastly, first term is a dummy variable that is coded
as one if it is the representative’s first term in office and zero otherwise.
Next, two dummy variables were included that indicate if the district was
represented by a party leader; H.O.R. Party Leader and Senate Party Leader.
The H.O.R. party leader variable was coded as one if the representative was the
majority party leader or minority party leader, and zero otherwise. The senate
variable was coded in the same manner. Although Lazarus and Steigerwalt (2009)
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(a) Senate (b) House of Representatives
Figure 4.1: Portion Of Total Grant Funding by Partisanship
found that party leadership was only significant in the H.O.R., it still may be an
important factor to control for because party leaders may be able to utilize their
political power to secure more funding and one of them is necessarily aligned with
the president. Furthermore, the president may allocate more funding to party
leaders, regardless of their alignment, in order to purchase their support for key
pieces of legislation.
The next set of control variables will indicate if the district was represented by a
democrat, H.O.R. Republican and Senate Democrat. H.O.R. Republican is coded
as one if the representative is a Republican and zero otherwise. Senate Democrat is
coded as one if the representative is a Democrat and zero otherwise. This variable
is included in the analysis because research has found that Democrats tend to
receive a higher portion of distributive spending (Alvarez and Saving, 1997), and
this trend is also persistent in the data as demonstrated by figure 4.1. Data for all
of these variables was collected from the Charles Stewart Committee Assignment
data set (Stewart, 2017).
Three electoral variables will also be included in the analysis: President Vote
Share, Representative Vote Share, and Senator Vote Share. There is reason to
believe that the president may want to allocate funds strategically in order to
maximize his votes (Berry et al., 2010). Thus, the portion of votes that the
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president received in state i is also included in the analysis to control for the
electoral importance of the state. In years where a presidential election did not
take place, this variable is coded as a zero. The representative vote share variable
controls for the electoral vulnerability of the representative. Past research has
demonstrated that vulnerable members tend to receive more distributive benefits
(Lazarus, 2009; Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009). This variable is the share of votes
that the representative received. In years where there was not an election, it is
coded as zero. Lastly, the senator vote share variable is the share of votes that the
senator received in the last election. If an election did not occur this variable is
coded as zero. Data for these variables was collected from the MIT Election Data
set (MIT Election Data, 2017).
Two additional variables to control for majority party status in both chambers
were also included in the analysis. There is a wide range of evidence suggesting
that members of the majority party receive a larger portion of funds (Berry et al.,
2010; Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009; Albouy, 2013). To control for a district being
located in a state where both Senators are members of the majority party Two MP
Senators was included in the analysis. Two MP senators is a dichotomous variable
that is coded as a one if both of the state’s senators are in the majority party and
zero otherwise. To control for a district being represented by a member of the
H.O.R. which belongs to the majority party H.O.R. Majority Party dummy was
included. The data for both of these variables was collected from Charles Stewart
Committee Assignment data sets.
4.2 Socioeconomic Control Variables
Four socioeconomic variables were also added to control for the socioeconomic
character of the state. It must be noted that the data for all four of these variables
was collected from the Census, and Bureau of Economic Analysis (B.E.A.). Thus
these variables are measured at the state level, not the congressional district level.
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The first socioeconomic variable is government workers. This is the total
amount of jobs working for the state or local government in a given state divided
by the labor force. Since the outcome variable only examines grants awarded to
state and local governments, states with a large public sector may receive a higher
portion of funds because they have a higher need for intergovernmental grants.
Therefore, the government workers variable was included to control for the size
of the public sector and the demand for funding. Unemployment Benefits also
controls for both the size of the public sector and the state’s demand for grant
dollars. States with a large number of unemployment benefits may require more
assistance from the federal government because they have a high amount of ex-
penditures and potentially a smaller tax base. The data for both of these variables
was collected from the B.E.A.
The next set of socioeconomic control variables were collected from Census pop-
ulation estimates and control for a state’s demographic factors. The first variable
is Percent Poverty. Percent in poverty measures the portion of a state’s population
that is living in poverty. States with a high percentage of the population living
in poverty may receive more federal grant dollars as a form of economic relief to
increase living standards. The last variable is minority. This variable is the total
amount of nonwhite residents living in a state divided by the state’s population.
This variable is included to control for other demand side factors such as programs
designed to help minority populations. There may be grant programs specifically
designed to target minorities. Thus states with a large minority population would
receive a larger share of those funds (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020).
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 4.2 displays a heat map of the continental U.S. for each year in the time
period of 2002 to 2017. The year 2001 was not included in the figure because
the census TIGER congressional district shapefiles were not available for 2001. In
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figure 4.2 the shading indicates the quantile of the percentage of annual competi-
tive grant funding that each congressional district was located in. Lighter shading
indicates that the congressional district received a higher percentage of annual
grant funding that year. The points located at the center of each congressional
district indicate if the district was aligned with the president.
This figure demonstrates that larger districts receive a higher percentage of
annual competitive grant funding, regardless of alignment status. At-large states
such as Montana and Wyoming are always located in the top quantile of an-
nual competitive grant funding, while the percentage of annual competitive grant
funding that smaller aligned districts receive trends to fluctuate from year to year.
Another, important geographic pattern revealed by figure 4.2 is that districts lo-
cated on the west coast tend to receive a larger percentage of annual competitive
grant funding. This may be due to the fact that there is more federal public
land located in the western region of the U.S., thus more federal grant dollars are
allocated to this region in order to help maintain the federal land.
Table 4.2 displays the average amount of funding per grant for every year in
the sample. In order to allow for a year to year comparisons, the funding values
are reported in 2018 U.S. dollars. The states and congressional districts that
received the lowest level of per grant funding and the highest level of per grant
funding are also displayed in Table 4.2. This table demonstrates that there is
a high level of variance in average per grant funding across states, congressional
districts, and years. The mean difference in average per grant funding between
the maximum state and minimum state across all 17 years is $8,019.45. With
regard to congressional districts, the mean difference between the maximum and
minimum district across all 17 years is $125,890.38. Thus there is considerably
more variance in the level of per grant funding at the congressional district level
than at the state level.
Figure 4.3 displays how the distribution of the portion of annual grant funding
a district receives changes with aligned and dis-aligned members of the H.O.R on a
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Figure 4.2: Geographic Distribution of Funds and Alignment: 2002-2017
logged scale. This figure demonstrates that there are more aligned districts in the
data set than dis-aligned districts. Furthermore, the measure of central tendency
of the portion annual grant funding is slightly larger in the aligned district. The
median portion of annual grant funding for aligned districts is 0.06%, while the
median portion of annual grant funding for dis-aligned districts is 0.05%.
Table 4.3 displays the results from a difference of means test performed on all
variables in the data set. The results demonstrate that the average percentage of
competitive grant funding that aligned districts received was slightly greater than
the percentage of annual grant funding allocated to dis-aligned districts. How-
ever, the p-value suggests that these differences are not statistically significant
at any level. The difference of means tests also revealed some differences in the
characteristics of aligned and dis-aligned districts. A larger portion of dis-aligned
districts were represented by Democrats in the H.O.R., and on average were lo-
cated in states with a larger percentage of the population living in poverty. A
larger portion of aligned districts were represented by members of the majority
party in the H.O.R. More aligned districts were also located in states where both
senators were members of the majority party and on average had higher levels of
unemployment benefits than dis-aligned districts.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Portion of Grant Funding in Aligned and
Dis-aligned Districts
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Table 4.3: Difference of Mean Test
Not Aligned Aligned Difference
Percent Funding 0.2274 0.2322 -0.0004
(0.6461) (0.7966) (0.775)
Representative V.S. 0.3082 0.3134 -0.0005
(0.3450) (0.3359) ( 0.514)
H.O.R. Republican 0.4835 0.5416 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.4998) (0.4983) (0.000)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.4010 0.6886 −0.0287∗∗∗
(0.4902) (0.4631) (0.000)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.0047 0.0045 0.0000
(0.0687) (0.0667) (0.8602)
H.O.R. Appropriations 0.1341 0.1394 -0.0005
(0.3408) (0.3464) (0.5094)
H.O.R. Ways and Mean 0.0903 0.0958 -0.0054
(0.2867) (0.2943) (0.418)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.0407 0.0682 -0.0275∗∗∗
(0.1976) (0.2522) (0.000)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0666 0.0349 0.03173∗∗∗
(0.2494) (0.1835) (0.000)
H.O.R. First Term 0.9838 0.9834 0.0003
(0.1261) (0.1275) (0.901)
President V.S. 0.1299 0.1323 -0.0002
(0.2364) (0.2386) (0.6624)
Senator V.S. 0.1753 0.1837 -0.0008
(0.2688) (0.2728) (0.1838)
Two MP Senators 0.3408 0.4765 −0.1357∗∗∗
(0.4740) (0.4995) (0.0000)
Senate Democrat 0.7013 0.6894 0.0191
(0.4577) (0.4628) (0.2657)
Senate Party Leader 0.0290 0.0207 0.0008∗
(0.1678) (0.1425) (0.02295)
Senate Appropriations 0.5293 0.5280 0.0001
(0.4992) (0.4993) (0.9095)
Gov. Workers 0.1266 0.1263 -0.0003
(0.0156) (0.0159) (0.365)
Unemployment Benefits 2523.93 2844.07 320.14∗∗∗
(3079.4125) (3794.6281) (0.0000)
Percent Poverty 13.4567 13.2018 0.2549∗∗∗
(2.9858) (2.8660) (0.000184)
Minority 1.2067 1.2117 0.0050
(0.591) (0.584) (0.713)
Mean estimates reports standard deviation in parentheses and the differences of means
test reports p-value in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Chapter 5
Methodology
The dependent variable is bounded by zero and one OLS regression will mis-
specify the functional form of the model. This problem arises because linear
regression estimates a constant relationship between the dependent variable and
the independent variables. Thus it is possible to obtain fitted values that fall
outside of the range of zero and one (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Kieschnick and
McCukkiugh, 2003; Murteira and Ramalho, 2016). The most common approaches
to modeling fractional outcome variables are beta regression, fractional logit, and
fractional probit regression.
This analysis will use fractional probit regression for three reasons. First,
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) note that in the beta distribution there is a zero
probability that the outcome variable will take on a value of zero or one (Prob(x =
0) = 0). Therefore, if zero or one is in the domain of the outcome variable beta
regression is not appropriate. As previously stated, there are observations of the
portion of annual grant funding that are equal to zero. Thus beta regression is
not appropriate. Second, Meaney and Moineddin (2014) find that beta regression
can produce biased estimates if the mean of the dependent variable is near the
boundary region of zero or one. Since the mean of the portion of annual grant
funding is very close to zero in the sample (portion annual grant funding has a
mean of 0.0022) the beta regression estimates may be biased.
Third, a fractional probit model was chosen over a fractional logit model to use
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panel data econometric techniques. Although Meaney and Moineddin (2014) find
that in large samples of cross sectional data fractional logit produces unbiased
estimates, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) find that fractional logistic regression
can produce inconsistent estimates in the presence of serial correlation. Serial
correlation is a common feature of panel data. Thus, fractional probit regression
is the more appropriate model and will be the primary regression that is estimated.
Equation 5.1 displays the model that will be estimated. In Equation 5.1 Φ(·)
is a link function that specifies the functional form of the conditional expectation
function. The fractional probit models use the CDF of the normal distribution
(Φ(·)) as the link function (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). This allows the frac-
tional probit model to produce fitted values that are bounded by zero and one.
E[Yi,t+1|·] = Φ(β0 + β1Alignedi,t + P ′θ +D′γ + αi + τt) (5.1)
In Equation 5.1, Aligned is the Aligned dummy variable discussed in the pre-
vious section and Y is the portion of annual competitive grant funding that a
congressional district received in a given year. The competitive grant funding
variable is lead forward one year, as recommended by Berry et al. (2010). This
reflects the fact that the funds awarded in year t were allocated from the budget in
year t−1. Thus the political factors that are present in year t−1 should effect the
distribution of grant funds because these are the factors that were present when
the appropriation decisions were made.
The identification strategy will be similar to the approach adopted by Berry
et al. (2010). Berry et al.’s identification strategy relies on the fact that changes
in the alignment variable are the result of two independent sources of variation.
First, the alignment variable may change as a result of a district electing a new
representative, holding the office of the president constant. Therefore, holding the
partisanship of the president constant, the model will estimate if a district expe-
rienced an increase in the portion of the annual competitive grant funding after
the aligned member took office. Second, holding the partisanship of the repre-
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sentative constant alignment may change as a result of a change in the president.
Allowing the model to estimate the change in the portion of annual competitive
grant funding that a district receives as a result of a change in the partisanship of
the president while holding the partisanship of the representative constant.
At the state level, there are a total of 96 changes in alignment. Holding the
party of the president constant, 12 of the changes in alignment were the results
of changes in the senator’s partisanship. Hold the partisanship of the senator
constant, 72 changes in alignment were the result of changes in the partisanship
of the president. There is substantially more variation in alignment at the dis-
trict level. There are a total of 1,792 instances of changes in partisan alignment.
Holding the president constant, 922 of the changes in alignment were the results
of changes in the partisanship of the representatives. Holding the partisanship of
the representatives constant, 870 changes in alignment were the result of changes
in the partisanship of the president.
In order to address any potentially unobservable time-invariant state idiosyn-
cratic factors a vector of congressional district fixed effects will be included in the
model. This is indicated by αi in equation 5.1. Year fixed effects are also included
to control for any confounding unobservable district invariant but time-variant
factors. This is indicated by τt in equation 5.1.
Several control variables will also be included in the model to account for
potentially confounding political factors. In equation 5.1 P is a vector of all of
the political control variables that were discussed in the data description chapter.
These variables include Representative Vote Share, H.O.R. Republican, H.O.R.
Majority Party, H.O.R. Party Leader, H.O.R. Appropriations, H.O.R. Ways and
Mean, H.O.R. Committee Chair, H.O.R. Ranking Committee Member, H.O.R.
First Term, President Vote Share, Senator Vote Share, Two MP Senators, sen-
ate Democrat, senate Party Leader, and senate Appropriations. These variables
will be included in the model to control for all political factors that vary across
districts and years which are theoretically correlated with the portion of grant
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funding that a district receives and alignment with the President. Lastly, D in
equation 5.1 is a vector of the socioeconomic factors that may influence a state’s
demand for competitive grant funding. These variables are Government Workers,
Unemployment Benefits, Percent in Poverty, and Minority.
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Chapter 6
Results
Table 6.1 displays the results for the base model. The model displayed in column
one of table 6.1 is my analysis of Berry et al.’s (2010) model for the entire sample.
The only difference between this model and Berry et al.’s model is that the model
in this analysis uses representative vote share and president vote share as electoral
control variables, while Berry et al. utilized close election dummies. However, the
findings in table 6.1 differ greatly from Berry et al.’s results. The results suggest
that alignment is positively related to the portion of annual total grant funding
that a district receives, however it is not statically significant at any level. It has
an associated p-value of 0.975. 1
Column two of table 6.1 adds the senate control variables and socio-economic
control variables. In order to conserve space the socio-economic control variables
discussed in chapters four and five are omitted from all of the regression tables pre-
sented in this chapter. However, every regression presented in this chapter includes
a vector of socio-economic factors. These factors are the following: government
employees, unemployment benefits, percent in poverty, and minority. 2
1It must be noted that the same model was estimated for the time period of 2001 to 2007,
the overlap period with Berry et al., however the results did not change. Therefore, they are not
reported in table 6.1.
2It must be noted that the socio-economic control variables be highly correlated with the
size of a state. Therefore to address any multicollinearity concerns all of the regression reported
in this section where re-estimated without the socio-economic control variables. However, the
findings did not changes. Therefore, only the models with socio-economic control variables are
reported as these are the more robust results.
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When the senate control variables and socio-economic control variables are
added to the model alignment remains statically insignificant. The p-value slightly
decreases to 0.890. Furthermore, the sign of the coefficient associated with align-
ment changes direction. Lastly, column three of table 6.1 displays the results
from a fractional probit regression. In the fractional probit model alignment re-
mains statically insignificant and negatively related to competitive grant funding.
Furthermore, the p-value is still very large with a value of 0.741.
The null findings presented in table 6.1 may in part be explained by agency
heterogeneity. Research finds that federal agencies are not homogeneous units and
they distribute grant funding differently based on their ideology, the majority party
in Congress, and the politicization if federal programs (Bertelli and Grose, 2009;
Ting, 2012). Therefore, aggregating all federal agency grants into one variable may
be problematic because it cannot account for political and institutional differences
between federal agencies.
To examine if agencies respond differently to alignment with the president, a
bivariate regression was performed on every agency in the sample. The portion
of annual competitive grant funding from agency i was regressed on alignment.
The results are displayed as a sign chart in table 6.2. These findings suggest that
federal agencies may indeed respond differently to alignment with the president.
Of the 30 agencies in the sample seven had a positive but statically insignificant
relationship with alignment, and 18 agencies had a negative but statically in-
significant relationship with alignment. There was one agency, the Delta Regional
Authority (D.R.A.), which had a negative and statically significant relationship
with alignment.
Five federal agencies had positive and statically significant relationships with
alignment. The five federal agencies with significant and positive relationship with
alignment were Corporation for National and Community Service (C.N.C.S.), De-
partment of Commerce (D.O.C.), Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (H.U.D.), National Science Foundation (N.S.F.), and Department of State
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Table 6.1: Alignment and Competitive Grant Funding
OLS OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment 0.00000670 -0.0000276 -0.0066898
(0.000218) (0.0001986) (0.0202542)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.000130 0.0001266 0.034066
(0.000300) (0.0003043) (0.0312648)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.000817 0.0008106 0.115178
(0.000632) (0.0006295) (0.07036)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.000150 0.0001342 0.0362228
(0.000382) (0.0003842) (0.0536795)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.0000733 0.0000868 0.035819
(0.000796) (0.000805) (0.1167047)
H.O.R. Appropriations 0.000499 0.000486 0.0446013
(0.000527) (0.0005248) (0.0509151)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.000811 -0.0008201 -0.1120518∗
(0.000442) (0.0004452) (0.0454719)
H.O.R. Republican -0.000204∗∗ -0.0002126∗∗ -0.0276258∗∗
(0.0000641) (0.0000617) (0.0094219)
H.O.R. First Term -0.00611∗∗ -0.0054961∗∗ -0.0837537
(0.00208) (0.0019564) (0.0750717)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. -0.000474 -0.0004995 -0.042585
(0.000941) (0.0009102) (0.1062145)
President V.S. 0.000709 0.0001707 -0.0246506
(0.00221) (0.002204) (0.2949109)
Senate Alignment 0.0000793 0.0248519
(0.0001832) (0.0248158)
Senator V.S. 0.0003541 0.0520975
(0.000211) (0.0298951)
Two M.P. Senators 0.0000569 -0.0137701
(0.0002081) (0.0231616)
Senate Democrat -0.0001366 -0.0638598
(0.0003098) (0.0455014)
Senate Party Leader 0.0000257 0.0169887
(0.0009409) (0.1083819)
Senate Appropriations 0.0001575 0.0331555
(0.000199) (0.0287062)
Socio-Economic Controls No Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.00846∗∗∗ 0.0056854∗ -2.816866∗∗∗
(0.00215) (0.0022078) (0.2779719)
N 7394 7394 7394
adj. R2 0.0145 0.0166
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(D.O.S.). These five agencies appear to be susceptible to presidential influence
while the rest of the agencies in the sample appear to be more insulated from
presidential influence. In order to estimate that effect of alignment on agen-
cies that have some degree of susceptibility to executive influence a new portion
of competitive grant funding variable was created using only competitive grants
funding from these five agencies. Since the new competitive grant funding vari-
able accounts for agency heterogeneity all models estimated in the remainder of
the paper will adopt this variable as the dependent variable. It must be noted
that the same models were estimated using competitive grant funding from all
federal agencies in the sample. However, for these models the alignment variable
was either statistically insignificant, had the incorrect sign, or both. Therefore,
these findings are not displayed in the paper.
Table 6.3 displays the results from an OLS regression and a fractional probit
regression using the new competitive grant funding variable. Column one displays
the results from the OLS regression and column two displays the fractional probit
model. When only looking at the five agencies which are susceptible to presidential
influence the alignment variable becomes positive and statically significant. The
results from the OLS regression suggest that a congressional district that is aligned
with the president will receive 0.0414% more annual competitive grant funding
than a district that is not aligned with the president, ceteris paribus. Assuming
an average annual budget of 1,997,368,206$ for all five agencies this amounts to
a 828,708.10$ increase in competitive federal grant funding. However, since the
portion of grant funding variable is fractional OLS missspecifies the functional
form. The results from the fractional probit regression suggest that, holding all
other variables at their mean values, a congressional district that is aligned with
the President will receive 0.0393% more annual competitive grant funding than
a district that is not aligned with the President. Assuming the same budget of
1,997,368,206$, this amounts to a 785,764.70$ increase in federal spending.
Table 6.4 examines if the relationship between alignment and competitive grant
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Table 6.2: Individual Agencies Sign Chart
Independent variable: Alignment
Agency Sign P-value
ARC - 0.485
CNCS∗ + 0.014
USDA + 0.822
DOC∗ + 0.015
DOD - 0.141
ED - 0.700
DOE - 0.731
HHS - 0.969
HUD∗∗ + 0.009
DOJ - 0.254
DOL - 0.539
NEA - 0.819
NEH - 0.933
NSF∗ + 0.032
SBA + 0.365
FMCS - 0.317
NARA + 0.306
USAID + 0.596
USACE - 0.217
DOS∗ + 0.042
NRC + 0.317
SSA - 0.591
TREAS - 0.701
DHS - 0.856
EAC + 0.198
VA - 0.298
STB - 0.456
DENALI - 0.432
DRA∗ − 0.014
EOP + 0.990
GCERC - 0.071
P-values were calculated using robust standard errors.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
funding changes in election years. Research has found that the president engages in
distributive politics during years that he is seeking re-election by allocating more
funds to swing states, and his constituency (Larcinese et al., 2006; Kriner and
Reevies, 2015; and Kang, 2018). Therefore, the President may also allocate more
competitive grant funds to congressional districts and states that are represented
by partisan aligned members of the H.O.R. and Senate.
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Table 6.3: Alignment and Filtered Competitive Grant Funding
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment 0.0004149∗∗ 0.0586704∗∗
(0.0001505) (0.0169196)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0001996 0.0360798
(0.0002328) (0.0250621)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.0008312 0.0908864
(0.0007975) (0.0686561)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0000553 0.0138852
(0.0002474) (0.0411897)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.000397 0.0745609
(0.00073) (0.1205278)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0001108 -0.0082725
(0.0002468) (0.03271)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0004768 -0.055211
(0.0002989) (0.0375057)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0001067 -0.0192298∗
(0.0000628) (0.0098125)
H.O.R. First Term 0.000343 0.1494977
(0.000905) (0.0957366)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.0013973 0.1839653
(0.0007208) (0.0977134)
President V.S. -0.0002196 -0.1651252
(0.0023018) (0.2747452)
Senate Alignment 0.0004367∗ 0.0544818∗
(0.0002008) (0.0243905)
Senator V.S. 0.0006186∗ 0.0960391∗∗
(0.0002594) (0.0329626)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0000814 -0.0113231
(0.000147) (0.018759)
Senate Democrat -0.0004567 -0.0405544
(0.0004946) (0.0484022)
Senate Party Leader -0.0004405 -0.0400465
(0.0005659) (0.0634896)
Senate Appropriations 0.0000881 0.0219296
(0.0002108) (0.027749)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -0.0003429 -3.050553∗∗∗
(0.0024541) (0.262416)
N 7394 7394
adj. R2 0.0026
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.4 does not provide any support for this theory. Column one of table 6.4
displays the results of a fractional probit regression using only years where there
was a congressional election. In this model neither the district or state alignment
variable are statically significant at any conventional level. The district alignment
variable has an associated p-value of 0.118, while the state alignment variable has
a p-value of 0.074. Column two of table 6.4 displays the result from a fractional
probit model that examines years in the sample when a presidential election was
held. The results are consistent with the congressional elections model. Neither
the district nor state alignment variables are statistically significant at any level.
The district alignment variable has a p-value of 0.220, and the state alignment
variable has a p-value of 0.479. These results suggest that aligned districts do not
receive a larger share of annual competitive grant funding during elections years.
It is also possible that alignment in the H.O.R. interacts with alignment in
the Senate. The president may want to distribute more funds to aligned districts
located in aligned states as a way of helping his legislative allies in both the H.O.R.
and Senate. Furthermore, the president has very little incentive to allocate more
funds to districts represented by dis-aligned members of the H.O.R. in dis-aligned
states because he would not be proving support to any members of his own party.
Table 6.5 tests the interaction between district and state alignment.
In table 6.5, column one displays the results from an OLS regression and col-
umn two displays the results from a fractional probit regression. The findings are
largely consistent between both models. The direct effects of district and state
alignment are not statically significant, while the interaction term is significant at
the 0.05 level. However, since district alignment and state alignment were inter-
acted it makes little sense to examine their individual significance levels. Results
from f-tests on all three variables, for both regression in table 6.5, suggest that
at least one of the variables is statically significant. The p-values of the f-tests
for the OLS regression and the fractional probit regression are 0.000. Since the
finding between the OLS regression and the fractional probit regression are largely
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Table 6.4: Election Years
Congressional Presidential
Alignment 0.0380067 0.0424407
(0.0243428) (0.0346156)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0516828 0.0485209
(0.0309789) (0.0373024)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.0531175 0.1718268∗
(0.0537598) (0.0862)
H.O.R. Ranking Member -0.0320557 -0.0130801
(0.053263) (0.0782881)
H.O.R. Party Leader -0.0178672 0.0247118
(0.1079583) (0.226119)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0135517 0.0433531
(0.0363767) (0.0461626)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0653453 -0.0617524
(0.0393919) (0.050222)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0160636 0.0083977
(0.0135608) (0.0141834)
H.O.R. First Term -0.1865829 0.5017737
(0.099851) (0.3189348)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.2788057∗ 0.0329636
(0.1239256) (0.2159341)
President V.S. -0.0023447 -0.0423697
(0.332382) (0.6600428)
Senate Aligned 0.0629183 0.0372685
(0.0352565) (0.0526642)
Senator V.S. 0.1013662∗∗ -0.0110665
(0.0329345) (0.0509103)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0163985 0.0082301
(0.0289484) (0.0493403)
Senate Democrat -0.025508 -0.0363253
(0.0610018) (0.0657137)
Senate Party Leader -0.048544 -0.086857
(0.0883598) (0.0764383)
Senate Appropriations 0.0268413 0.0945623∗
(0.0357807) (0.0388399)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -2.632974∗∗∗ -2.305089∗∗
(0.3864722) (0.8477323)
N 3480 1740
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the same, and the fractional probit model is more robust, only the results from
the fraction probit model will be discussed. The results suggest that, holding all
other variables at the means, aligned districts in dis-aligned states experience a
0.00636% decrease in annual competitive grant funding. Holding all other variables
at their mean values, dis-aligned districts in aligned states experience a 0.00571%
increase in annual competitive grant funding. Lastly, aligned districts in aligned
states receive a 0.06941% increase in annual competitive grant funding, holding
all other variables at their mean values. The findings with regard to aligned dis-
tricts in aligned states are the only results that have reasonable interpretations.
It makes little sense for aligned districts in dis-aligned states to fair worse off than
dis-aligned districts in dis-aligned states. Furthermore, the findings suggests that
the effect of district and state alignment is quite large. Assuming an average an-
nual budget the results suggest that a district, with all other factors held at their
mean values, can experience a 1,386,373$ increase in competitive grant funding
from being aligned with the president and located in aligned states.
The results in this section find very weak evidence for the relationship between
alignment with the president and annual competitive grant funding. When look-
ing at all agencies in the sample there is no evidence of a relationship, however
this finding may be the results of heterogeneous agency attributes that have not
been controlled for. After the portion of annual competitive grant funding variable
has been filtered to only include agencies with a significant positive association
between district alignment and competitive grant funding the results slightly im-
prove. When examining all years in the sample there is evidence of a significant
positive relationship between alignment at the district level and competitive grant
funding. However, this relationship is highly sensitive to model specification and
the years examined in the analysis. When looking at congressional or presiden-
tial election years the significance disappears. Furthermore, when an interaction is
added to the model it gives unreasonable results for the direct relationship between
district alignment and competitive grant funding.
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Table 6.5: Interaction Between State and District Alignment
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment -0.0000461 -0.0107685
(0.0002764) (0.0375056)
Senate Alignment 0.0001133 0.009403
(0.000258) (0.0339022)
Alignment X Senate Alignment 0.0007021∗ 0.1022192∗
(0.0003138) (0.0447574)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0002106 0.0375424
(0.0002337) (0.0250936)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.0008537 0.0904222
(0.0007974) (0.0672286)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0000542 0.0107185
(0.0002466) (0.0412846)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.0004306 0.0720834
(0.0007133) (0.116837)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.000104 -0.0053129
(0.0002444) (0.0317626)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.000486 -0.0568168
(0.0002995) (0.0373591)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0000933 -0.0182855
(0.0000611) (0.0096842)
H.O.R. First Term 0.0002285 0.1395575∗
(0.0009196) (0.0933538)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.0013884 0.1811591
(0.0007199) (0.0979565)
President V.S. -0.0002924 -0.1793253
(0.0022991) (0.2738342)
Senator V.S. 0.0005986∗ 0.0949745∗∗
(0.0002582) (0.0332525)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0000897 -0.0138633
(0.0001469) (0.0186303)
Senate Democrat -0.0004066 -0.0371475
(0.0004926) (0.0480842)
Senate Party Leader -0.0004185 -0.0394033
(0.000569) (0.0640429)
Senate Appropriations 0.0000819 0.0207832
(0.0002099) (0.0275027)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -0.000734 -3.005194∗∗∗
(0.00228) (0.2604196)
N 7394 7394
adj. R2 0.0037
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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There are two possible explanations for these findings. First, it may be that
only aligned districts in aligned states experience an increase in competitive grant
funding, while district alignment in a dis-aligned state has no effect on annual
competitive grant funding. There is some evidence of this relationship from the
findings in table 6.5. In both models in table 6.5 the interaction term was positive
and statically significant at the 0.05 level, while both the direct effect of state
alignment and district alignment were not statically significant at any level.
Second, the year 2011 may mark a structural break in the federal spending time
series. In 2011 the congressional moratorium on earmarks was implemented which
may have substantially reduced the level of influence that members of Congress
had over federal spending (White, 2018). The proceeding sections will examine the
relationship between partisan alignment with the president and competitive grant
funding in the earmark era and post earmark era to determine if this relationship
has changed after the moratorium was enacted. In order to examine how the
enactment of the earmark moratorium may have altered the relationship between
alignment and annual competitive grant funding the sample was divided into two
parts. An “earmark era” time period which contains observations from 2001 to
2010, and a “post earmark” time period that contains observation from 2012 to
2017.
6.1 Earmark Era
The results for the base model estimates in the earmark era are displayed in table
6.6. Column one of table 6.6 displays the results of an OLS regression and column
two of table 6.6 displays the results from a fractional probit regression. The first
term variable was omitted from the OLS regressions estimated in this section
because of perfect multicollinearity. Neither of these models provide any support
for a relationship between district or state alignment and annual competitive grant
funding in the earmark era. The district alignment variable is not statistically
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significant at any level and has the incorrect sign. Although, the state alignment
variable has the correct sign it is also statistically insignificant in both models of
table 6.6. The state alignment variable has a p-value of 0.070 for the fractional
probit regression.
In order to examine the role of elections in the earmark era the congressional
and presidential elections models were re-estimated using only observation prior
to 2011. The results are displayed in table 6.7. Column one displays a fractional
probit model only using observation from years when a congressional election
was held in the earmark era, and column two displays a fractional probit model
using only observations from years with a presidential election in the earmark era.
The finding are consistent with the results in the previous section. Both district
alignment and state alignment are not statistically significant in the congressional
election model at convectional levels. The district alignment variable has a p-value
of 0.302, and the state alignment variable has a p-value of 0.102. With regard to
presidential elections the district and state alignment variables are not statistically
significant either. In the presidential election model the p-value associated with
district alignment is 0.521 and the p-value associated with state alignment is 0.666.
Furthermore, the district alignment variable has the incorrect sign.
Lastly, the interaction model was re-estimated for the earmark era. The results
are displayed in table 6.8. Column one displays the findings from an OLS regres-
sion and column two displays the findings from a fractional probit model. The
finding are largely consistent between the two models. Therefore only the results
from the fractional probit model will be discussed. The district alignment, state
alignment, and interaction term are all statistically insignificant in the fractional
probit model. Consistent with the result in the previous section the estimated
direct effect of district alignment is negative. In order to test the joint significance
of all three coefficients an f-test was conducted and the results indicate that none
of the coefficient are significantly different from zero. The p-value associated with
the f-test is 0.1867. Thus, the interaction between district alignment and state
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Table 6.6: Earmark Era
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment -0.0001169 -0.0154595
(0.0001633) (0.0229089)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0007619∗∗ 0.1145645∗∗∗
(0.0002589) (0.0319676)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.000607 0.0642617
(0.0008871) (0.0739261)
H.O.R. Ranking Member -0.0002234 0.0013112
(0.000573) (0.0698341)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.000000 0.0287755
(0.0006014) (0.1075876)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0002655 -0.0350302
(0.0002928) (0.0423202)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.000601 -0.0645317
(0.0003807) (0.0475565)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0001167 -0.0155242
(0.0000982) (0.0149258)
H.O.R. First Term -0.1071126
(0.2188683)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.0022575∗∗ 0.2770206∗∗
(0.0008139) (0.0966257)
President V.S. -0.001434 -0.2947947
(0.0029208) (0.3985455)
Senate Alignment 0.0004602 0.0571806
(0.0002362) (0.031532)
Senator V.S. 0.0011135∗∗ 0.1683123∗∗∗
(0.0003747) (.0446436)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0001029 -0.0215704
(0.0001734) (0.0258144)
Senate Democrat -0.0001602 0.0080117
(0.0005017) (0.0570494)
Senate Party Leader -0.0001015 0.0101205
(0.0006736) (0.070852)
Senate Appropriations -0.0002336 -0.0203054
(0.0005448) (0.0690233)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -0.006443 -3.391871∗∗∗
(0.006407) (0.535602)
N 4350 4350
adj. R2 0.0092
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.7: Earmark Era: Elections
Congressional Presidential
Alignment 0.0672003 0.0754658
(0.0651118) (0.1174822)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0431271 0.0510357
(0.0630094) (0.1215556)
H.O.R. Committee Chair -0.025233 0.3702871∗∗
(0.068213) (0.1363483)
H.O.R. Ranking Member -0.025908 0.1803592
(0.0783675) (0.1385375)
H.O.R. Party Leader -0.0852258 0.0733305
(0.096228) (0.1378492)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.028472 0.053697
(0.0484678) (0.0779664)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0605511 -0.0292659
(0.0545539) (0.1468406)
H.O.R. republican -0.029683 0.0175436
(0.0185152) (0.0320836)
H.O.R. First Term 0.0818679 -3.063001
(0.2932768) (1.776167)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.275157 -0.0628428
(0.1149353) (0.2668064)
President V.S. -0.2865125 -2.440645∗
(0.4750669) (1.075107)
Senate Alignment 0.0703905 0.0455669
(0.0430043) (0.1056261)
Senator Vote Share 0.1730699∗∗ -0.02092
(0.0447712) (0.0876555)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0091454 0.1195241
(0.0343674) (0.1199237)
Senate Democrat 0.018481 0.1705367
(0.0690678) (0.1290713)
Senate Party Leader 0.0064985 -0.0263496
(0.0905699) (0.0918655)
Senate Appropriations 0.0084839 0.2115453∗
(0.0877345) (0.0884643)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -2.637802∗∗∗ -3.941384
(0.8796027) (2.047956)
N 2175 870
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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alignment does not appear to have an effect on competitive grant funding in the
earmark era.
The results presented in this section find no evidence of a relationship between
alignment and competitive grant funding in the earmark era. When examining
all years prior to 2011 neither the district alignment nor the state alignment vari-
ables were statistically significant. The relationship remained insignificant for
congressional and presidential election years. Furthermore, the direction of the re-
lationship between district alignment and competitive grant funding was negative
in presidential election years. Lastly, the interaction between state and district
alignment was also insignificant in the earmark era.
These findings may in part be explained by the fact that during the earmark era
congress had considerably more power over federal spending than the president.
Bogie (2018) notes that prior to the earmark moratorium earmarks allowed federal
spending to heavily favor powerful members of Congress. Kuhn (2017) notes that
the congressional moratorium on earmarks has weakened congressional channels
of influence over distributive spending, while leaving presidential influence unaf-
fected. Therefore, during the earmark era majority party status, congressional
electoral politics, and committee membership may have been the relevant factors
influencing competitive grant funding, not alignment with the president. This is
consistent with the current findings. Although the coefficients associated with the
political control variables do not have causal interpretations, majority party sta-
tus in the H.O.R. and Representative vote share were statistically significant and
positively related to competitive grant funding in four of the six models estimated
in this section providing more support for the notion that political factors in the
H.O.R. influenced the distribution of competitive grant funding, not presidential
influence.
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Table 6.8: Earmark Era: Interaction between State and District
Alignment
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment -0.0004715 -0.057462
(0.0002968) (0.042296)
Senate Alignment 0.0001804 0.0256982
(0.000331) (0.0464094)
Alignment X Senate Aliment 0.0005458 0.0634851
(0.0003901) (0.0562535)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0007652∗∗ 0.1141241∗∗
(0.0002585) (0.0319208)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.0006355 0.0646809
(0.0008874) (0.0725054)
H.O.R. Ranking Member -0.0002373 -0.0028525
(0.0005756) (0.0710874)
H.O.R. Party Leader 0.0000288 0.0260622
(0.0006057) (0.1065165)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0002511 -0.0327054
(0.000292) (0.0421046)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0006052 -0.0652946
(0.0003819) (0.0474702)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0001099 -0.0159175
(0.0000978) (0.0149893)
H.O.R. First Term -0.1145448
(0.2193596)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. 0.0022539∗∗ 0.2760058∗
(0.0008136) (0.096889)
President V.S. -0.0015134 -0.300392
(0.0029049) (0.3954576)
Senator V.S. 0.0010987∗∗ 0.1659717∗∗
(0.0003714) (0.0444551)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0001038 -0.0224197
(0.0001731) (0.0255996)
Senator Democrat -0.0001435 -0.0092571
(0.0005011) (0.0565486)
Senate Party Leader -0.000099 0.0101204
(0.0006776) (0.0713022)
Senate Appropriations -0.0002267 -0.0189852
(0.0005413) (0.0684736)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -0.0048987 -3.161932∗∗∗
(0.0057668) (0.483623)
N 4350 4350
adj. R2 0.0095
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6.2 Post Earmark Era
Table 6.9 displays the results for the base model in the post earmark era. Col-
umn one displays the findings from an OLS regression and column two displays
the findings from a fractional probit regression. Once again the alignment vari-
ables remains statistically insignificant. The p-value associated with the district
alignment variable is 0.342 in the OLS regression and 0.506 in the fractional probit
regression. With regard to state alignment it has a significant effect on competitive
grant funding in both models. The p-value associated with the state alignment
variable is 0.030 in the OLS regression, and 0.110 in the fractional probit re-
gression. The findings from the fractional probit model suggest that, holding all
other variable at their mean values, a congressional district located in an aligned
state will experience a 0.05783% increase in annual competitive grant funding.
Assuming an average budget of 1,416,366,566$ in the post earmark era, this is a
819,084.79$ increase in annual competitive grant funding.
When examining election years the results are largely consistent with the find-
ings from the past two sections. Table 6.10 displays the results from the two
elections models. Column one presents the results from a fractional probit regres-
sion using only observation from years when a congressional election was held in
the post earmark era, and column two displays the results from a fractional probit
model using only observation of years when a presidential election was held in the
post earmark era. Once again the district and state alignment variables remain
statistically insignificant for the congressional elections model at all levels. In the
congressional elections model the district alignment variable has a p-value of 0.262
and the state alignment variable has a p-value of 0.924. Furthermore, the state
alignment variable has the incorrect sign associated with it. With regard to pres-
idential elections the district and state alignment variables remains statistically
insignificant at all levels. The district alignment variable has a p-value of 0.119,
and the state alignment variable has a p-value of 0.589.
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Table 6.9: Post Earmark Era
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment 0.0002213 0.0209424
(0.0002327) (0.0314813)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0005283 0.0776831
(0.0004231) (0.0575097)
H.O.R. Committee Chair -0.0002813 -0.0453709
(0.0003886) (0.0734202)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0006667 0.1466505∗
(0.0004012) (0.0707424)
H.O.R. Party Leader -0.0013365∗ -0.2453047∗∗∗
(0.000631) (0.0457645)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0003702 -0.0542727
(0.0003354) (0.0490102)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0000118 -0.008971
(0.0006978) (0.0837345)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0000878 -0.0160286
(0.000145) (0.0221213)
H.O.R. First Term -0.00133∗ -0.2297596∗
(0.000565) (0.0749805)
H.O.R. Representative Vote Share -0.0011578 -0.1906905
(0.0010496) (0.1683282)
President V.S. 0.0012557 0.0449938
(0.0021658) (0.3042608)
Senate Alignment 0.00074∗ 0.0934094∗
(0.0003278) (0.0431332)
Senator V.S. -0.0005368 -0.0584146
(0.000337) (0.0459263)
Two M.P. Senators -0.0001542 -0.0213026
(0.0002073) (0.0274913)
Senate Democrat -0.0009841 -0.1196697
(0.0007079) (0.0862925)
Senate Party Leader -0.0014452 -0.2073688
(0.0009902) (0.134953)
Senate Appropriations 0.0004102 0.0743035∗
(0.0002292) (0.0367691)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant 0.0317016 1.250094
(0.0165097) (2.399833)
N 2609 2609
adj. R2 0.0019
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6.10: Post Earmark Era: Elections
Congressional Presidential
Alignment 0.0361454 0.077038
(0.0322316) (0.0493717)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.112908 0.0043153
(0.0646799) (0.0727831)
H.O.R. Committee Chair 0.010449 0.0166431
(0.0884044) (0.1135895)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0527671 0.1421951
(0.0801475) (0.1038487)
H.O.R. Party Leader -0.2056092∗∗ -0.1724501
(0.0603928) (0.1768547)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.0484488 -0.0270164
(0.0606247) (0.0649896)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.043955 0.0182768
(0.047694) (0.0498169)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0188885 0.0114022
(0.0253872) (0.0309861)
H.O.R. First Term -0.5189593∗∗∗ -2.248936∗
(0.1315097) (2.988433)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. -0.283929 -0.4184749
(0.2293453) (0.3442471)
President V.S. 0.1697124 0.4299787
(0.3513014) (0.656483)
Senate Alignment -0.0083755 0.082248
(0.0881917) (0.1523461)
Senator V.S. -0.0437719 -0.0092399
(0.0441375) (0.0767721)
Two M.P. Senators 0.0531199 -0.076019
(0.0826754) (0.142226)
Senate Democrat -0.0468092 -0.100874
(0.1160059) (0.1725678)
Senate Party Leader 0.1623837∗∗ 0.166138
(0.6093934 ) (0.8628029)
Senate Appropriations 0.0622085 0.0702505
(0.0476118) (0.0646154)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant -3.161∗∗∗ -0.3614794
(0.556) (2.137849)
N 1305 870
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Lastly, table 6.11 displays the results from the base model with the inclusion
of an interaction between district and state alignment in the post earmark era.
Column one displays the results from an OLS regression and column two displays
the results from a fractional probit regression. Once again the findings are largely
consistent between the two models, therefore only the results from the fractional
probit model will be discussed in depth.
The findings in table 6.11, for the post earmark era, differ from the results pre-
sented in the previous section. The effect of district alignment and the interaction
term are positive but statically insignificant, while the direct effect of state align-
ment is positive and statically significant. In order to test the joint significance
of all three coefficients an f-test was applied. The results indicate that at least
one of the coefficients is statically significant. The f-test results have a p-value
of 0.0120. The findings indicate that, holding all other factors at their mean, an
aligned district in a dis-aligned state will receive a 0.01086% increase in annual
competitive grant funding. A dis-aligned district in an aligned state will receive
a 0.05584% increase in annual competitive grant funding, holding all other vari-
ables at their mean. Lastly, an aligned district in an aligned state will receive a
0.07075% increase in annual competitive grant funding, holding all other variables
at their mean values. This amounts to a 1,002,079.30$ increase in federal funds,
assuming an average annual budget in the post earmark era.
The results in this section find that alignment has an effect on competitive
grant funding in the post earmark era, given certain conditions. In presidential
elections years aligned districts received a larger share of competitive grant fund-
ing, while alignment at the state level had no effect on competitive grant funding.
Furthermore, the results from the interaction suggest that aligned districts in
aligned states receive the largest share of competitive grant funds. Therefore, in
the post earmark era presidential alignment has some influence on competitive
grant funding.
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Table 6.11: Post Earmark Era: Interaction between State and District
Alignment
OLS Fractional Probit
Alignment 0.0003355 0.0198997
(0.0003809) (0.0593278)
Senate Alignment 0.0008153∗ 0.0927677∗
(0.0003563) (0.0466316)
Alignment X Senate Alignment -0.0001725 0.0015176
(0.0003957) (0.0668311)
H.O.R. Majority Party 0.0005175 0.0777781
(0.0004219) (0.0575298)
H.O.R. Committee Chair -0.0002821 -0.0453992
(0.0003885) (0.0735478)
H.O.R. Ranking Member 0.0006638 0.14665∗
(0.0004032) (0.0707314)
H.O.R. Party Leader -0.0013469∗ -0.245326∗∗∗
(0.0006265) (0.045768)
H.O.R. Appropriations -0.000373 -0.0541834
(0.0003349) (0.0490604)
H.O.R. Ways and Means -0.0000005 -0.0090276
(0.0006965) (0.0833624)
H.O.R. Republican -0.0000866 -0.0160393
(0.0001452) (0.0221077)
H.O.R. First Term -0.0012907∗ -0.2300951∗∗
(0.000565) (0.0758216)
H.O.R. Representative V.S. -0.0011651 -0.1907843
(0.0010495) (0.1688187)
President V.S. 0.0012288 0.0449688
(0.0021584) (0.3044593)
Senator V.S. -0.0005304 -0.0584158
(0.000336) (0.0459194)
Two M.P. Senator s -0.0001533 -0.021271
(0.0002081) (0.027317)
Senate Democrat -0.0010124 -0.1193889
(0.0007033) (0.0857362)
Senate Party Leader -0.0014472 -0.2074675
(0.0009901) (0.1347517)
Senate Appropriations 0.0004111 0.0742832∗
(0.0002291) (0.0367438)
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Constant 0.0316337 1.187371
(0.0164641) (2.32442)
N 2609 2609
adj. R2 0.0019
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by congressional district.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 6.1: Alignment Coefficient Plot
6.3 Event Study
This section further investigates how the relationship between alignment and com-
petitive grant funding may change through time by conducting an event study
analysis. Figure 6.1 displays the results for the baseline model. These results were
obtained by estimating the fractional probit model in table 6.3 with the inclu-
sion of an interaction between the district alignment variable and all of the year
dummies. Figure 6.1 plots the point estimates of the coefficients associated with
the alignment year interaction terms and the 95% confidence interval for each
coefficient.
The findings in figure 6.1 suggest that the relationship between alignment and
the portion of annual competitive grant funding is not conditional on the year.
There is not a discernible pattern in the point estimates across time. The point
estimates of the coefficient appear to oscillate around zero, however, there is not a
clear difference in the trend of the point estimates before and after the enactment
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Figure 6.2: Interaction Between District and State Alignment
of the earmark moratorium in 2011. There is also no clear time trend when only
looking at the point estimates of coefficients associated with congressional election
years or presidential election years.
The findings in 6.1 may be explained by the fact that the model does not ac-
count for the interaction between alignment at the district and state levels. Find-
ings from the previous sections suggest that aligned districts located in aligned
states received the largest share of competitive grant funding and that this re-
lationship materialized after the enactment of the earmark moratorium. Figure
6.2 examines if the relationship between aligned districts located in aligned states
and competitive grant funding is conditioned by the year. The model estimated in
figure 6.2 is the baseline fractional probit interaction model estimated in table 6.5
with the inclusion of a full interaction between district alignment, state alignment,
and all of the year dummies.
The findings in figure 6.2 provide support for this theory. Although none of the
coefficients in figure 6.2 are statically significant there is a discernible trend in the
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point estimates of the effect of district and state alignment. Prior to 2011, in the
earmark era, there does not appear to be a relationship between the aligned district
located in aligned states and competitive grant funding. The point estimates are
random scattered above and below zero, and starting in 2008 the effect of the
interaction between district and state alignment on competitive grant funding
appears to be growing more negative. This is most likely the result of a series
of budget appropriations reforms that congress started enacting in 2007 to curb
government spending and corruption (Gordon, 2018; White, 2015). However, after
the enactment of the earmark moratorium, in 2011, the magnitude of the yearly
effect of the interaction between alignment at the district and state level begins to
increase. This suggests that the moratorium on earmarks may have empowered
presidential influence in the appropriations process, with the president directing
more funds to aligned districts located in aligned states.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The results from this analysis find weak support for the relationship between par-
tisan alignment with the president and the portion of annual competitive grant
funding that a congressional district receives. When examining total competitive
intergovernmental grants there does not appear to be any relationship between
competitive grant funding and alignment with the president. However, this null
finding is the result of agency heterogeneity. Consistent with past research (Bertelli
and Grose, 2009; Ting, 2012), results suggest that federal agency respond differ-
ently to alignment with the president. Some agencies appear to be susceptible to
presidential influence while others are not effected by alignment. When only exam-
ining agencies that are susceptible to influence there is a weak positive relationship
between alignment and competitive grant funding.
These findings present somewhat of a challenge the results from Berry et al.
(2010) which find strong evidence of a relationship between a congressional dis-
trict’s alignment with the president and the amount of federal funds the district
receives. However, the model utilized in this analysis is more robust due to the fact
that it controlled for senate variables and socio-economic factors, both of which
were omitted from Berry et al.’s model. Furthermore, this analysis examined ag-
gregate agency spending while Berry et al. examined 26 individual programs.
There may be a weak relationship between alignment and competitive grant fund-
ing at the agency level, however some federal programs, such as T.I.G.E.R., may
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be highly susceptible to presidential influence. Thus there could be a strong rela-
tionship at the individual program level.
The results also suggest that the effect of alignment on annual competitive
grant funding does not change in election years. This somewhat contradicts finds
from Larcinese et al. (2006), Kriner and Reevies (2015), and Kang (2018) who
all find that the president has a higher tendency to engage in distributive politics
during elections years. However, neither the state nor district alignment variables
were significant in any of the election model, and this holds for both the pre and
post earmark periods. Furthermore, the results from the event study analysis
suggests that aligned districts do not receive an increase in competitive grant
funding during election years.
The results from the earmark ban analysis also provides some support for
White’s (2018) argument that the earmark moratorium empowers the president
in the grant appropriations process. Indeed the alignment variables were not
statistically significant in any of the models estimated during the earmark era.
This finding is attributed to the fact that during the earmark era powerful members
of Congress had considerable influence over the distribution of federal funding
(Bogie, 2018), not the president. When examining the post earmark period the
results suggest that aligned districts located in aligned states tend to receive a
higher portion of annual competitive grant funding. In the baseline model findings
indicate that the state alignment has a significant effect on the portion of annual
competitive grant funding in the post earmark period, while district alignment
remains insignificant. However, this model fails to account for the interaction
between district and state alignment. The results from the interaction models
indicate that aligned districts located in aligned states received the largest share
of competitive grant funding. The findings from the event study analysis suggest
that this trend materialized after the enactment of the earmark moratorium. Thus
there is some evidence that rather that eliminating wasteful government spending
the earmark moratorium simply empowered the president in the appropriations
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process.
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Two central challenges to the aggregation process existed. First, if some grant
funds were given back to the federal government or reallocated, the total grant
variable was entered as a negative variable. Funds were often awarded in year t
and then the excess returned in year t+ 1. This creates a problem when summing
by state (congressional district); and year. There are three possibilities. First, the
amount of funds awarded in year t+ 1 is greater than the excess funds from year
t. Thus the total grant funding variable is positive. Second, the amount of funds
awarded in year t + 1 is equal to the excess funds from year t. The means that
the total grant funding variable will have a value of zero. Third, the amount of
funds in year t + 1 is less than the excess funds from year t. Therefore, the total
grant funding variable would have a negative value because the state (congressional
district) returned more funds to the federal government than the received from the
federal government in year t+ 1. For the small portion of aggregate observations
with negative total grant funds the value was changed to zero.
The second issue in the aggregation process was missing observations for con-
gressional districts. Missing observations for congressional districts took two
forms. First, no congressional district entered in the data. Second, the recorded
congressional district did not exist. The latter was assumed to be a miss-entered
district. In both cases efforts were made to recover as many of the true congres-
sional districts as possible.
Calculating the total grant funding variable for the H.O.R. data set was more
complicated due to the presence of missing and mis-entered districts. This vari-
able was calculated by summing the dollar amount of every grant awarded to a
congressional district in a given year. However, a number of data pre-processing
steps were necessary to ensure that the congressional district was correctly spec-
ified. First, a master list of congressional district for each year in the sample
was create from the U.S. Census TIGER shape files (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020).
Then every district was checked against the master list to determine whether that
district did in fact exist. If the district had a match in the master list then no
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more pre-processing was necessary. However, if the district did not have a match
then the state in which the congressional district was located in was compared
with was compared with a list of at large state in each given year. If there was
a match then the district was re-coded as zero, otherwise it continued to remain
unknown.
Next a geospatial database of all US states, congressional districts, and coun-
ties was created in arcGIS using TIGER share files (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020).
The congressional district were then spatially joined to their respective counties
(counties with more than one congressional district where excluded from the join).
Once this was complete the data was exported from arcGIS. All of the counties
associated with the unknown congressional were match with counties from the GIS
data. Districts with matches were re-coded to the correct district; the remaining
districts continued to the final pre-processing stage. In the final stage another
geospatial database was created that contained data on US states, congressional
districts, and ZIP codes. ZIP codes were spatially joined to the corresponding
congressional district (ZIP code in more than one district were dropped). The
ZIP codes of remaining missing district were compared with newly created list. If
there was a match the district was re-coded to the correct value, otherwise it was
dropped from the analysis.
Unfortunately even after all of the pre-processing a significant portion of the
congressional districts remained unknown, and therefore, must be excluded from
the analysis. This amounts to 477,913 observations, or approximately 13.55%
of grants in the sample. The dollar value of these missing districts ranges from
−752, 877, 282$ to 1, 921, 000, 000$, with a mean of 430874.80$ and a median of
142984$. There are also 3,709 observation that take on a value of zero, and
31,949 observations that take on negative values. There are unknown Congres-
sional districts for 43 of the 50 states. These state include the following: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
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Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Ok-
lahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
